Analysis of welfare in auctions comes traditionally via one of two approaches: precise but fragile inference of the exact details of a setting from data or robust but coarse theoretical price of anarchy bounds that hold in any setting. As markets get more and more dynamic and bidders become more and more sophisticated, the weaknesses of each approach are magnified.
Introduction
Modern developments in design and implementation of decentralized markets have led to the creation of large and complex systems of interacting agents. The case in point are the In this context the participating agents are constrained both strategically (due to the need in forming beliefs over the signals in high-dimensional spaces) and computationally (due to the need to compute best responses that involve large non-convex optimization problems).
These issues call for the consideration of departures from the traditional Nash equilibrium settings when analyzing these large games, such as approximately best responding agents or learning agents. However, while these extensions make the behavioral model more realistic it makes it significantly harder to use the data on the observed behavior of agents and either reverse-engineer their preferences or predict their behavior.
Our focus in this paper is on counterfactual inference in auction environment with a special focus on stochastic multi-unit auctions used to allocate and price the sponsored search ads. The typical task of the counterfactual inference involves recovering the preferences of interacting agents from the data and then use them to predict the agents' behavior for the new (counterfactual) auction mechanism.
In this paper we develop a general framework that produces sets of counterfactual welfare outcomes of an optimal allocation in general multi-unit auctions. Our work relies on the insights created by the idea of the price of anarchy that has been studied in the recent years in the theoretical Computer Science literature. The notion of the price of anarchy was first introduced in Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [1999] for network routing games, and it provides a bound on the ratio of the revenue or welfare from the implementation of the second best and the current mechanism over all possible uncertainties in the market.
An attractive feature of the price of anarchy bounds is that their evaluation is based on considering agent-by-agent deviation from the equilibrium bids and therefore are not difficult to compute.
The price of anarchy uses the rules of the auction to determine the range of auction outcomes without relying on any data on how agents bid in those auctions.The worst-case nature of price-of-anarchy leads to very robust bounds which apply to a range of deviations from the standard Nash equilibrium outcomes. However, theoretical bounds generated by the price of anarchy are based on considering the worst-case scenario over possible values of agents. If we have access to data on agent's behavior, these data can provides information regarding the possible ranges of agents's values that can be significantly smaller than the worst case.
In this paper we interested in the specific counterfactual scenario of the optimal allocation. In the context of such auctions risk-neutral bidders are characterized by a single parameter expressing their valuation per click. Athey and Nekipelov [2010] show that in Nash equilibrium in the sponsored search auction the best response generates a one-toone mapping between the values per click and observable bids of participating agents.
However, this analysis turns our to be brittle even in cases where the data are generated by a Nash equilibrium. The recovery of values relies on the assumption that agents face an increasing cost for each additional allocated item. If this assumption is not satisfied, then the inverse of best responses of bidders do not return single values instead producing ranges of values consistent with the bid of each agent. The construction of these ranges significantly complicates the estimation procedure. Moreover, it is sensitive to assumptions made regarding the unobservable components of the model and requires smoothness of the distributions of random auction parameters and bis. Our proposed approach is robust to these distributional assumptions and it does not require invertibility or uniqueness of best responses.
The phenomenon where the parameter of interest cannot be pin-pointed from the data even if the entire data distribution is available to the researchers has been extensively considered in Economics. The models where parameters cannot be singled out are referred to as partially identified. In these models first studied by C. Manski (see Manski [2003] for a survey) the primary goal of the analysis is the characterization and inference of the tightest set that can be formed around the true parameter that generates the data, which is called the identified set. The structure of identified sets has been studied primarily in the single item auction settings, e.g. Haile and Tamer [2003] consider identified sets for the distribution of values for English auctions where agents are not best responding, Tang [2011] , Aradillas-López et al. [2013] , Komarova [2013] consider deviations from the independent private value assumption. The analysis of identified sets for values of bidders in auctions indicates that they are often difficult to compute even for simple auctions.
In this paper, we bridge the robust and computationally attractive but coarse theoretical price of anarchy bounds and precise but brittle and difficult to compute identified sets for auctions outcomes. We do so by integrating data directly into the price of anarchy analysis. Instead of quantifying over all settings and uncertainties, we take the worst case over all settings and uncertainties that could induce the distribution of observed data. The more we know about the data generated by a mechanism, the higher the potential for an accurate bound.
Our approach benefits from the inherent robustness of worst-case analysis to realistic market features such as differences in details of mechanisms or agents who only approximately best-respond. At the same time, our approach uses the data and effectively informs the price of anarchy bound regarding the "worst case scenario" distributions of uncertainty that are clearly inconsistent with the observed data. This allows us to improve the welfare bounds produced by non data-driven theoretical price of anarchy approach.
Importantly, our approach is also helpful in more standard Nash equilibrium settings.
The standard approach for inference from equilibrium in an auction relies on the inversion of best responses. Such an inversion requires the best responses to be unique, strictly monotone in the values an continuous. In addition, inference in these settings requires making assumptions regarding the distributions of uncertainty (such as smoothness, support, boundedness of densities from above and below, etc.). Our framework produces bounds for welfare outcomes of auctions that do not require these conditions.
Methods
Theoretical. Our theoretical techniques for proving empirical Price of Anarchy bounds are largely an empirical application of the revenue-covering framework of Hartline et al. [2014] .
First, we analyze the optimization problem of a bidder, comparing actions in the auction based on their expected price-per-unit (or first-price equivalent bid in the terminology of Hartline et al. [2014] ).
Second, we relate the revenue of an auction to a threshold quantity, which is based on how expensive allocation is. We call this empirical revenue covering, and differs from revenue covering of Hartline et al. [2014] only in that we measure it for a given instance of an auction instead of proving it for every possible strategy profile. As a result, our empirical revenue covering framework applies even more broadly that theoretical revenue covering:
it can be measured for any Bayes-Nash Equilibrium of any single-parameter auction in the independent, private values model. Finally, we consider and measure how agents would react to the optimization problem that they are faced with. In the terminology of Hartline et al. [2014] , we measure the value-covering of the auction, which improves on the 1 − 1 e term. This can be done both with precise knowledge of price-per-unit allocation rule, or with rough knowledge of concentration bounds on the price-per-click allocation rule.
Our general approach can also be seen as reducing the empirical analysis of an auction to the econometric question of estimating the revenue of an auction and estimating the allocations and prices-per-unit of actions in the auction.
Econometrics. Our econometric approach is based on recovering the price and allocation functions from the auction data: provided that we observe the realizations of uncertainty (regarding the bids of participating agents and the scores assigned to the agents by the mechanism), the empirical approximation to the price and allocation functions for each agent are based on computing the average price and average allocation for each possible bid across historical auctions. We demonstrate that if payment and allocation rules are (weakly) monotone in the bids, then both the expected price and expected allocation functions can be recovered accurately uniformly over the bid space. Our analysis does not rely on the continuity or differentiability of the "true" payment and allocation functions.
Our main Econometric result is the lower bound for the auction welfare in terms of the welfare of the optimal allocation established with probability approaching 1. This bound does not rely on continuity or monotonicity of best responses of agents or smoothness of the distirbution of bids and auction parameters. We also note that our results extend beyond the standard i.i.d. data settings allowing us to consider complex serially correlated time series data that satisfy the β-mixing conditions which is compatible with various learning dynamics.
Robustness. Our results adopt a robustness to changes in the mechanism or the setting that is similar to the inherent robustness of results from the revenue covering or smoothness frameworks.
• Changes in the Mechanism. As the thresholds we calculate are based on the priceper-unit allocation rule of a bidder, threshold quantities can be compared and computed no matter what the mechanism is as long as these quantities can be estimated. If for instance an auctioneer is A/B testing many different auctions, the same analysis can be used for their comparisons as long as the prices-per-unit and allocations from actions can be learned.
• Approximate Equilibrium. If the agents in an auction only -best respond to the optimization problem that they are faced with, then our efficiency results only degrade by that . Moreover, if some agents are irrational and some are rational, then our results can be broken out to give efficiency results only for the rational bidders.
• No-Regret Learning. The same exact guarantees that we produce via our method hold even if the data that we observe are not the result of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a stochastic setting, but rather they are the result of no-regret learning algorithms of players with fixed values. An alternative interpretation of this result is that our guarantees hold even if the observed empirical distribution of bids constitutes a coarse correlated equilibrium of the auction and degrade gracefully if they constitute an -approximate coarse correlated equilibrium. Thereby our guarantees are versatile in our assumptions on the behavior of players in the auction.
• Learning Quality Scores. We model the quality score of a bidder as coming from a known distribution. This distribution should be interpreted as the auctioneers knowledge of the quality score of the bidder. Our efficiency results give a comparison to the optimal auction subject to the same knowledge of quality scores of the bidders. This distribution moreover can have arbitrary correlations, as it only really affects the space of feasible allocations.
Contributions
Our primary contributions are the following:
• Empirical Price of Anarchy. We introduce the empirical Price of Anarchy (EPoA) benchmark for welfare, representing the worst case efficiency loss of a game consistent with a distribution of data from the game.
• Empirical Revenue Covering. We refine the revenue-covering framework of Hartline et al. [2014] for proving robust EPoA bounds, and show that we can empirically estimate empirical revenue covering with very fast convergence properties.
• Data. We apply and bound the empirical price of anarchy from GSP advertising auctions run in Microsoft's Bing, and show that we get EPoA bounds that are significantly stronger than the relevant theoretical bounds.
Related Work
Our approach for empirical revenue covering is primarily an empirical application and refinement of the revenue covering framework in Hartline et al. [2014] , which uses the revenue-covering property to prove theoretical bounds for auctions that always satisfy the revenue-covering property. The revenue covering approach itself is a refinement of the smooth-games and mechanisms frameworks of Roughgarden [2009, 2012] , Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] for the Bayesian setting. Hartline et al. [2014] also give revenue approximation results for the first-price auction with the optimal reserve prices, which we do not.
Our techniques could be used for improved bounds for revenue if the optimal reserve prices were known and implemented, or with the assumption of more symmetry in the setting.
The notion of thresholds and revenue covering is also strongly related to the threshold and the c-threshold approximate concept in Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] .
The efficiency of the Generalized Second-Price auction (GSP) was originally modeled and studied in full-information settings in Edelman et al. [2007] and Varian [2009] . Gomes and Sweeney [2014] characterize equilibrium in the Bayesian setting, and give conditions on the existence of efficient equilibria. Athey and Nekipelov [2010] give a structural model of GSP with varying quality scores, which are included in our model. Caragiannis et al.
[2014] explores the efficiency of GSP in the Bayesian setting, and finds a theoretical price of anarchy for welfare of 2.927 when the value distributions are independent or correlated, and players do not overbid. Our results apply only for independent distributions of values, but do not need the no-overbidding assumption. However, our approach applies even to the modified GSP which is used where the scoring ruled used for ranking is not equal to the quality γ i of a bidder. The latter theoretical results do not apply for this modified GSP.
Hence, in principle we could observe higher inefficiency in the data than the theoretical bound above. Despite this fact we find in the data that only better inefficiency bounds are derived, with the exception of one search phrase where we almost exactly match the latter worst-case theoretical bound. The semi-smoothness based approach of Caragiannis et al. [2014] can be seen through our model as using a welfare covering property in place of revenue covering.
Preliminaries
We consider a single-dimensional mechanism design environment with n bidders and quasilinear preferences. Each bidder i has a private value v i drawn independently from distribution F i over the space of possible values V i ⊆ R + . We denote the joint value-space and distribution over values V = Π i V i and F = Π i F i respectively. An auction A, in this setting, solicits actions and decides on the outcome, which consists of an allocation x i ∈ [0, 1] and a payment P i ∈ R + for each player i ∈ [n]. Observe that the allocation of a player is a single-dimensional quantity. Bidders have a linear utility, so if they pay P i to receive an allocation X i , the utility of the bidder is
The allocation output by the auction needs to satisfy allocation constraints: the vector of allocations (x 1 , . . . , x n ) has to lie in some feasibility space X . We assume that the feasibility constraint is also random and specifically it is completely determined by contextual information that the auctioneer receives before deciding the allocation, but which the bidders do not receive when deciding their bids. Specifically, we will assume that the auctioneer observes a context γ from some context space Γ and decides an allocation that belongs to a feasible space X (γ). Moreover, this context is drawn from some distribution G.
Allowing for such a random feasibility constraint is important when applying our method to data-sets from sponsored search auction marketplaces, where the context is essentially the quality scores of the advertisers for the impression that arrived.
An auction A consists of a bid space B, an allocation rule X : B n × Γ → X , mapping from bid profiles and contexts to feasible allocations and a payment rule p :
mapping from bid profiles and contexts to payments. For a set of values, bids and a context, the utility generated for each bidder is:
Interim allocation and payment functions. A strategy σ i : V i → B, for each player i, maps the value of the agent to his bid. Given an auction A and a strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ), we will often use and consider the expected allocation and payment an agent expects to receive when playing a bid b i , taking expectation over other agents values and over the context. We call
We will denote with x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) and with p = (p 1 , . . . , p n ) the vector of interim allocation functions and interim payment functions that arise at the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the auction.
A strategy profile σ is in Bayes-Nash Equilibrium (BNE) if for all agents i, σ i (v i ) maximizes their interim expected utility: e.g., for all values v i and for all bids b ∈ B,
The welfare from an allocation profile (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is the expected utility generated for both the bidders and the auctioneer, which due to quasi-linearity boils down to being the total value that the agents receive: i v i · x i . Thus the expected utility of a strategy profile σ is
We will break down the welfare of the auction into the revenue paid to the auction-
] and the utility derived by the agents,
Our benchmark for welfare will be the welfare of the auction that chooses a feasible allocation to maximize the welfare generated, thus
We will denote the resulting optimal value and context based allocation rule as
Policy space and marginal feasible allocations.. When arguing about approximate efficiency of an auction, it will be useful to use the feasible allocations that could be awarded to each player in expectation over the contextual information. If we denote with Π the set of policies that map contexts γ to feasible allocations π(γ) ∈ X (γ), then the marginal expected allocation of player i in expectation over contexts is E γ∼G [π i (γ)]. We say that an allocation vectorx = (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) is marginally feasible if there exists a policy π ∈ Π such that for each i ∈ [n]:
We denote withX the set of such marginally feasible allocations. Then observe that we can re-write:
Observe that we could have avoided complication with contexts and policies by defininĝ X as the set of feasible allocations, ignoring the contextual structure that gives rise toX.
However, when working with data-sets we will be observing samples of the context and not expectations over the contexts. Hence, this extra structure is needed to argue about sampling errors in subsequent sections.
Worst-case Bayes-Nash price of anarchy.. The Bayesian price of anarchy of an auction is defined as the worst-case ratio of welfare in the optimal auction to the welfare in a BayesNash equilibrium of the original auction, taken over all value and context distributions and over all equilibria. We will denote with BN E(A, F, G) the set of Bayes-Nash equilibria of an auction A, when values are drawn from distributions F and context is drawn from distribution G. Then:
Sampling model and main question
We will assume that we observe a sample of bid profiles and contexts from an auction A. Specifically, we observe T samples of the form: (
based on an unknown Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game. Specifically at each iteration: first a valuation profile v t is drawn from an unknown F and then a bid profile is drawn from σ(v t ), where σ is a Bayes-Nash. We will denote with D(F, σ)
this distribution from which b t are drawn i.i.d..
Given this observed data we want to refine our prediction on the efficiency of the auction and find a bound on the price of anarchy of the auction conditional on the observed data set. Specifically, we want to make statements of the form: after seeing T samples, with probability at least 1 − δ(T ), the price of anarchy of the auction with respect to the true underlying distributions F, G and the true underlying Bayes-Nash σ is at most α. More formally, conditional on (b 1:T , γ 1:T ), with probability at least 1 − δ(T )
In the latter inequality, ρ is the empirical analogue of the worst-case price of anarchy ratio, that we could have derived solely based on the rules of the auction and without looking at data-sets.
We will tackle this question in two steps. First we will show how we can derive a better bound on the price of anarchy if one knows the true distribution D, from which the bids are generated, and the true distribution G from which the contexts are generated. We will denote this refined bound as the empirical price of anarchy of the auction. We develop this part in Section 3. Subsequently, we will show that our approach for bounding the empirical price of anarchy is robust to sampling errors. Hence, even if we have samples and use empirical averages rather than true expectations, our upper bound will be close to the true upper bound. We prove this part in Section 4.
Price of Anarchy from Data
We begin by defining the empirical price of anarchy of an auction, conditional on a given bid distribution D and a given context distribution G. The empirical price of anarchy is the worst possible price of anarchy over all value distributions F and over all possible Bayes-Nash equilibria, that result in a bid distribution D(F, σ) equal to D. This notion has nothing to do with sampled data-sets, but rather is a hypothetical worst-case quantity that we could calculate had we known the true bid generating distribution D(F, σ) from which the bids in our data-set are generated.
Definition 3.1 (Empirical Price of Anarchy). The empirical price of anarchy
EPoA(A, D) of an auction A and a distribution of bid profiles D, is the worst-case ratio of welfare in the optimal auction to the welfare in an equilibrium, taken over all distributions and equilibria that could generate the bid distribution D:
Leveraging the distributional knowledge. What does the extra information of knowing D and G give us, as opposed to the worst-case price of anarchy setting, where we do not have such knowledge?
To answer this question, we first focus on the optimization problem each bidder faces.
At any Bayes-Nash equilibrium each player must be best-responding in expectation over his opponent valuations and in expectation over the contexts. In particular:
Observe that if we know the rules of the auction A and the distributions D and G, then the functions x i (·) and p i (·) can be uniquely determined. Specifically, we can write:
Thus when bounding the empirical price of anarchy, we can assume that the vectors of interim allocation and payment functions x and p are known and can be used as given quantities in the analysis. This is a crucial observation.
Moreover, observe that the revenue of the auction is also uniquely determined when we have this information, since it does not depend on the valuations of the players and one the Bayes-Nash strategy profile, but only on the induced distribution of bids. Thus we can write:
as the expected revenue of the auction, which again is a known quantity when bounding the empirical price of anarchy.
Shorthand notation. Throughout the rest of this section we will fix the distributions D and G. Therefore, for the sake of brevity we will omit these distributions from the above parametric notation, using
and Rev(D, G).
Empirical Revenue Covering
In this section, we refine the revenue covering framework of Hartline et al. [2014] . Notably, we provide a version of revenue-covering that applies for a given distribution of bid profiles and contexts rather than taking the worst-case revenue covering over all valuation distributions and Bayes-Nash equilibrium strategy profiles. The framework is an adaptation of the (λ, µ)-smoothness framework and proceeds in showing two properties, where each corresponds to bounding λ and µ respectively. If these properties hold for an auction, then the price of anarchy can be shown to be bounded by
Our analysis of the empirical price of anarchy is based on a simple observation: if we have access to the bid distribution D and the context distribution G, then we can pin-point more accurate bounds on the quantities λ and µ that the worst-case distributions used in theoretical analyses. We can essentially produce constants λ(D, G) and µ(D, G) that are tailored to the two distributions. Moreover, we will then show in the next section that our approach is robust to statistical errors and if instead of the true D and G, we just use their empirical averages, the resulting sampling error on the welfare guarantee is small.
Price-Per-Unit allocation curves. We can re-write the expected utility from a bid b as:
This can be viewed as the same form of utility that a player would have if the auction was a first price auction and he submitted a bid of
. We will denote this term as the price-per-unit and denote it with ppc(b) =
. Thresholds and revenue covering. We will most often use the inverse of the PPU allocation rule for our analysis; let τ i (z) =x
i (z) be the price-per-unit of the cheapest bid that achieves allocation at least z. More formally, τ i (z) = min b|x i (b)≥z {ppc(b)}. A crucial quantity that will drive our upper bound on EPoA is that of the threshold for an allocation (see Figure 6 in the Supplementary Appendix for an illustration of T i (x i ) on the plot of the price-per-unit allocation rule):
Definition 3.2 (Threshold Function). The threshold function for agent i and allo-
The total threshold for the allocation x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is then the sum of the thresholds across all agents, i T i (x i ).
2 We now refine the notion of revenue-covering from Hartline et al. [2014] to incorporate knowledge of the distribution of bids D and contexts G. 
where the maximum is taken over all marginal feasible allocationsx inX .
Now we show that empirical revenue covering immediately implies an upper bound on the empirical price of anarchy of the auction A conditional on distributions D, G (see Figure 4 in the Supplementary Appendix for a plot of the price of anarchy as a function of µ). 
The proof is provided in the Supplementary Appendix.
Computational methodology
Theorem 3.1 provides our first method for bounding the empirical price of anarchy. All we need is to compute the revenue Rev of the auction and the quantity: Suppose for now that we are given explicit representations of the two distributions D and G, i.e. these distributions are finite (in the sampling version of the problem, these would be the empirical observed distributions in the data, thereby by definition finite). In this representation, the first quantity Rev is a simple expectation over the distribution.
When we have samples from the distributions this will simply be an empirical average, as we will see in Section 4. Thereby the expected revenue is efficiently computable.
Computing the second quantity involves an optimization problem over the space of marginal feasible allocations. Moreover, observe that T i (·) are convex functions as they are integrals of monotone functions. Thereby the objective is convex. Hence, when the space of marginal feasible allocationsX is some polytope, then the optimal will be some integral solution of the polytope. This reduces the continuous optimization problem to a combinatorial optimization problem. Ignoring computational concerns, the latter can be computed from the input distributions and an empirical analogue of it can also be computed when we have samples. Even with computational concerns, the latter can be sometimes efficiently computed. For instance, as we will see in the case of position auctions (Section 5), if there is no contextual information γ (e.g. quality scores are fixed and not random), then the latter optimization problem is a simple matching problem.
However, when there exist random contextual information the optimization problem invoked when computing T is typically computationally hard, due to the complexity of the marginally feasible allocation spaceX . In fact as we will see it is NP-hard for the position auction model with uncertain quality scores, which we will analyze in Section 5 and which we will use for the data-set we analyzed.
We address this problem, by proposing upper bounds T on T, that are efficiently computable. Subsequently we can use T /Rev as our µ.
The central upper bound that we will use when analyzing our sponsored search dataset is based on the fact that threshold functions T i (·) are convex functions. Specifically, let X i = maxx ∈X x i denote the maximum possible marginal allocation of bidder i. The latter quantity is typically efficiently computable, as it corresponds to giving player i the maximum possible allocation for each instance of the context γ ∈ Γ.
Then observe that by convexity for any feasible marginal allocationx i :
Hence, we will use this linearized version of the thresholds instead of the true thresholds, in our optimization problem, i.e. we define:
Computing T 1 turns out to be a much easier computational problem than computing T. Specifically, by linearity of expectation and by the policy interpretation of marginally feasible allocations:
Now observe that the problem inside the expectation is equivalent to a welfare maximization problem where each player i has a value-per-unit of v i = T i (X i )/X i and we want to maximize the welfare: i v i · x i subject to the vector x being in X (γ).
Typically the latter optimization problem for each instance of γ ∈ Γ will be efficiently computable, as it is a simple linear optimization problem. For instance, in the case of position auctions that we will see in Section 5, the latter optimization would be solvable by a greedy algorithm.
Thus the relaxation T 1 is efficiently computable whenever the welfare maximization problem for each instance of the feasibility space X (γ) is efficiently computable. When used on actual data-sets, the approach is effectively running the latter welfare maximization problem for each sample of the contexts seen.
Further refinement on EPoA bound: Empirical Value Covering
We can also use the input distributions to improve the 1/(1 − e −µ ) factor in the empirical price of anarchy bound. In Theorem 3.1, this term comes from value covering (Lemma C.1), which analyzes how bidders react to the price-per-click allocation rules they face. In the proof of Theorem 3.1, it is shown that no matter what the price-per-unit allocation rule is, it is always the case that
When we can observe the price-per-unit allocation rules, we can simply take the worst case over the price-per-unit allocation rules that we observe for each player, giving an improved price of anarchy result. 
14) Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Theorem 3.1, using the value covering parameter λ in place of the general value covering result, Lemma C.1.
If we have already shown that the auction is empirically µ-revenue covered, then we can find the best λ such that the auction is λ-value covered by simply picking the following quantity:
If valuations and bids are bounded and finite (e.g. discretized in cents), then the latter quantity can be computed by simply iterating over possible values and possible bids.
If in the revenue covering part we use upper bound T 1 and show that the auction is empirically µ-revenue covered with respect to the upper bound T 1 , the maximization can be simplified to only consider the allocation amount X i , i.e.: The proof and a table of better numerical results are included in the Supplementary Appendix.
Summing up
Theorems 3.1 and 3.2 imply the following approach for bounding the empirical price of anarchy if we are given the distributions D and G:
1. Compute allocation and payment functions x and p for each bidder.
Compute threshold functions T i for each bidder and expected revenue of the auction

Rev.
3. Compute an (efficiently computable) upper bound T (e.g. T 1 defined in Equation (3.12)) on the maximum sum of thresholds T (defined in Equation (3.10)).
Define µ =
Rev T and return a bound of µ 1−e −µ on the EPoA(A, D, G). 5. Define λ µ as in Equation (3.15). Return more refined bound of µ λ µ on the EPoA(A, D, G) (if T 1 is used in the revenue covering part, then use more efficiently computable λ µ,1 , defined in Equation (3.16)).
In Section 5 we will see how this generic approach applies to a sponsored search auction setting and present empirical results by applying this approach to data-sets from Bing. In that section we will also see what exact algorithms are used to compute the upper bound
Before we proceed with this application, we analyze the robustness of the above methodology to sampling errors, when instead of having access to distributions D and G, we just have access to samples from them and hence access to empirical versions of them.
Statistical properties of the Empirical Price of Anarchy
Our empirical approach is based on estimation of the interim price and allocation function from the observed data on actual allocations and prices. We are going to adhere to the settings where in each auction t we observe the bids of n eligible bidders i = 1, . . . , n denoted b i,t .
3 We assume that we observe T instances of the auction for each bidder whose allocation we consider in the EPoA bound.
As we mentioned previously, real-world auctions involve additional context γ corresponding to the parameters that set the auction (such as the reserve price or quality score factors in sponsored search auctions). Our results apply to the general settings where instances of contexts γ t in auction t follow a stationary stochastic process and can, in general, be correlated with previously and currently observed bids.
We now characterize the structure of the allocation and pricing rules X i (b, γ) and P i (b, γ) that defines "auction logic", i.e. the function that takes context γ and bids b as inputs and outputs the prices and allocations to the bidders. We now impose the assumption that ensures that the set of values of these functions is not "too large" that allows us to bound the pseudo-dimension of the space containing them. That bound will be at most polynomial in the number of bidders n. Assumption 4.1 can be directly verified, for instance, for the sponsored search auctions where γ correspond to the vector of quality factors of the bidders, e.g. as in Edelman et al.
[2007] and Varian [2009] . In that case the price and the allocation rule are determined solely by the ranks and the values of the score-weighted bids γ t b it .
Our inference will be based on the idea that the customization of the order of bidders to users generates randomness, that in turn, allows us to apply the concentration inequalities to the prices and allocations averaged over T auction instances.
We allow general setting where the bids and context are correlated (i.e. there can be auction-level features that affect both the auction parameters and the bids). At the same time, we also notice that in our formulation we allow the values of the bidder to come from an arbitrary distribution with bounded support and be correlated both across bidders and over time. In particular, the possibility of fixed values of the bidders (such as in Edelman et al. [2007] , Varian [2009] and Athey and Nekipelov [2010] ) is included as a special case.
Since context γ can be random (auction by auction), the interim allocation and price rules x i (·; D, G) and p i (·; D, G) are computed as expectations over the joint competing bid and context distributions. Provided that the data sample {b t , γ t } T i=1 induces empirical distributions D and G, we can estimate the interim payment and allocation rule taking the expectation over the empirical distribution leading to
To simplify notation we denote
In our subsequent analysis we use the fact that for the class of (n − 1 + dim(Γ))-dimensional monotone functions outlined in Assumption 4.1 one can construct a set of -brackets of size O(exp(1/ n−2+dim(Γ) )) such that for each function from this class we can find two brackets within in L 1 norm that bound this function from above and from below.
4
Theorem 4.1. Suppose that sequence (T ) → 0 such that (T )
and Pr sup
The result of the theorem suggests that under fixed (or bounded) number of bidders in the auctions, the estimated interim price and allocation rule have the error that contracts at the rate of a power function of T .
Next we turn to the analysis of the quantities that lead to the expression for the revenue covering-based bound for EPoA, namely the threshold functions T i (·). To establish the property of the threshold function we impose an additional condition that ensures that any non-zero allocation requires the payment from the bidder at least proportional to that allocation. 
We define the empirical analog of function τ i (·) by τ i (z) = inf
, which determines the smallest per unit price that bidder i needs to pay in order to get allocated the item with probability of at least z determined by the estimated interim allocation rule.
The empirical analog of T i (x) is obtained by:
Our next step will be to establish the uniform convergence of the estimated function T i (x) to T i (x) over the bid space.
Now we investigate how the replacement of the true thresholds with the empirical thresholds affect the outcome of maximization over possible allocations. DefineT = max
This corollary states that the empirical analog of the optimized threshold max
approaches to its true value and the distance between the true and the empirical value is shringing at the rate γ(T ) ((n log T )/T ) 1/2(n+dim(Γ)) .
The last component is the estimation of the expected revenue. We note that the expected revenue can be defined over the distribution of bids and context as Rev
This is a simple unconditional expectation and can be well approximated by the expectation over the corresponding empirical distribution
This object converges to the true revenue at the rate √ T by standard central limit theorem.
Thus we established that both the empirical analog for the optimized threshold max x∈X i T i (x i ) and the empirical analog for Rev converge to their true counterparts. Moreover, the optimized threshold converges to its true population value at the rate that is slower than √ T . This means that we can compute the parameter of the empirical revenue covering bound for the Empirical Price of Anarchy using the estimated quantities. The large deviation probability will be determined by the large deviation probability of the estimated optimized threshold sice the error in the estimation of the revenue will be relatively negligible. Below we establish the main statistical result of the paper that derives the lower bound for the welfare of a given auction mechanism relative to the optimal welfare that is attained with probability approaching 1. for any sequence
Sponsored Search Auction: model and methodology
We consider a position auction setting where k ordered positions are assigned to n bidders.
An outcome m in a position auction is an allocation of positions to bidders. m(j) denotes the bidder who is allocated position j; m −1 (i) refers to the position assigned to bidder i. When bidder i is assigned to slot j, the probability of click c i,j is the product of the click-through-rate of the slot α j and the quality score of the bidder, γ i , so c i,j = α j γ i .
We will generally assume that γ i is drawn independently from distribution G i , and is observable to the auctioneer, but not to the bidder themselves. The quality scores
Since the auctioneer can use the quality scores in assigning bidders to slots and the quality scores impact the number of clicks that each agent sees, a marginal allocatioñ x = (x 1 , . . . ,x n ) is feasible if and only if there is a quality-score dependent assignment of slots to bidders that gives rise to this allocation. The quality scores are exactly the contexts that we have used thus far in the general single-dimensional environment.
Denote by ρ(γ, ·) such an assignment, where ρ(γ, j) is the player who is assigned position j when the quality score profile is γ and ρ −1 (γ, i) is the position assigned to player i.
Moreover, denote with M the space of all such quality score dependent assignments. Then a marginal allocation vectorX is feasible if there exists ρ ∈ M such that for each bidder i:
We will denote the resulting optimal value-based allocation rule X * .
We consider data generated by advertisers repeatedly participating in a sponsored search auction. The mechanism that is being repeated at each stage is an instance of a generalized second price auction triggered by a search query.
The rules of each auction are as follows: Each advertiser i is associated with a click probability γ i and a scoring coefficient s i and is asked to submit a bid-per-click b i . Advertisers are ranked by their rank-score q i = s i · b i and allocated positions in decreasing order of rankscore as long as they pass a rank-score reserve r. If advertisers also pass a higher mainline reserve r m , then they may be allocated in the positions that appear in the mainline part of the page, but at most k advertisers are placed on the mainline.
If advertiser i is allocated position j, then he is clicked with some probability c i,j , which we will assume to be separable into a part α j depending on the position and a part γ i depending on the advertiser, and that the position related effect is the same in all the participating auctions: c i,j = α j · γ i . We denote with γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ m ) the vector of position coefficients. All the mentioned sets of parameters θ = (s, α, γ, r, r m , k) and the bids b are observable in the data. Moreover, the parameters and bids are known to the auctioneer at the allocation time. Going back to our general model from the previous sections, we can fit this application by considering the whole parameter vector θ as the context, even though just the quality scores affect the feasibility constraints.
We will denote with π b,θ (j) the bidder allocated in slot j under a bid profile b and parameter profile θ. We denote with π −1 b,θ (i) the slot allocated to bidder i. If advertiser i is allocated position j, then he pays only when he is clicked and his payment, i.e. his price-per-unit (or cost-per-click) is the minimal bid he had to place to keep his position, which is:
where with M we denote the set of mainline positions.
We also assume that each advertiser has a value-per-click (VPC) v i , which is not observed in the data. If under a bid profile b, advertiser i is allocated slot π −1 b,θ (i), his expected utility is:
See Section C.1 in the Supplemental Appendix for a discussion of efficiently computing thresholds in a position auction setting.
Sponsored Search Auction: Data Analysis
We applied our analysis to the BingAds auctions. We analyzed eleven phrases from multiple thematic categories. For each phrase we retrieved data of auctions for the phrase for the period of a week. For each phrase and bidder that participated in the auctions for the phrase we computed the allocation curve and by simulating the auctions for the week and computing what would have happened at each auction for each possible bid an advertiser could submit. We discretized the bid space and assumed a hard upper bound on the bid amount.
See Figure 7 in the Supplemental Appendix for the allocation and threshold curves for a subset of the advertisers for a specific search phrase. We computed the threshold curves by numerically integrating the allocation curves.
We then applied all of the techniques described in Section 3 for each of the search phrases.
We first computed the optimal upper bound on the thresholds T 1 and by observing the revenue of the auctions from the data, we can compute an upper bound on the revenue covering of the auction for the phrase, i.e. µ 1 = T 1 /Rev. Then for this µ 1 we optimized over λ by using the allocation curves and assuming a hard upper bound on the valuation of each advertiser to find the optimal such λ bound, denoted by λ 1 . Then an upper bound on the empirical price of anarchy is µ 1 /λ 1 .
Subsequently we tested the tightness of our analysis by computing the value of the true thresholds on the optimal allocation that was computed under the linear approximations of the thresholds. This is a feasible allocation and hence the true value of T is at least the value of the thresholds for this allocation. Hence, by looking at the value of the thresholds at this allocation, denoted by LB − T we can check how good our approximation of T is T 1 . Then we also computed the optimal thresholds for any quality score independent allocation rule. Apart from yielding yet another lower bound for T, the latter analysis also yields an empirical price of anarchy with respect to such a handicapped optimal welfare, which can also be used as a welfare benchmark.
We portray our results on these quantities for each of the eleven search phrases in Table   1 . Phrases are grouped together according to the thematic category of the search phrase.
The columns have the following interpretation:
1. EP oA 1 is the upper bound on the empirical price of anarchy, i.e. if 1/EP oA 1 is x it means that the welfare of the auction is at least x · 100% efficient. This lower bound is computed by using the polynomially computable upper bound T 1 of T and then also optimizing over λ.
2. µ 1 = T 1 /Rev is the ratio of the upper bound on the maximum sum of thresholds over the revenue of the auction.
3. λ 1 is the minimum lambda across advertisers for the allocation curve of each advertiser, assuming some upper bound on the value. Then based on Lemma 3.2, EP oA
4. LB − T/Rev: we use the optimal allocation computed by assuming the linear form of thresholds used for T 1 . Then we evaluate the true thresholds on this allocation. This is a feasible allocation and hence the value of the thresholds on this allocation, denoted LB − T is a lower bound on the value of T. Thus this ratio is a lower bound on how well the auction is revenue covered.
5. LB − EP oA, this is simply the empirical price of anarchy bound that would have been implied if T = LB − T and even if we optimized over λ. Thus
is an upper bound on how good our efficiency bound could have been even if we solved the hard problem of computing T.
6. T avg , this corresponds to the optimal thresholds with respect to any quality score independent feasible allocation as defined in Section 3.
7. F A − EP oA a bound on the empirical price of anarchy with respect to a quality score independent allocation rule. For this price of anarchy we did not optimize over λ, hence
.
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Appendix A: Robustness: Learning Agents and Empirical Price of Anarchy
We show that the exact same analysis as in the previous section extends even if the data we observe are not generated from a Bayes-Nash equilibrium of a stochastic i.i.d. valuation
setting, but rather are generated from learning agents whose valuation is fixed and who are experimenting on how to play, using some no-regret learning algorithm.
In this setting, we assume we observe a sequence of data D of T timesteps. The empirical price of anarchy takes the following definition Definition A.1 (Empirical Price of Anarchy for Learning Agents). The empirical price-of-anarchy for learning agents of an auction and a distribution of data D generated by the auction is the worst-case ratio of welfare in the optimal auction to the welfare in an equilibrium, taken over all valuation profiles and learning outcomes that could generate the sequence of data D.
A.1. Average Utility, Average Price-per-click
We first focus on the optimization problem each bidder faces. When bidding in a sequence of auctions, we assume that each bidder i, with some value v i , is submitting a sequence of bids b t i , such that in the limit he achieves no-regret with respect to any fixed bid in hindsight:
For simplicity, we will assume that the for the sequence we observe, each bidder has zero regret for his value, with respect any fixed bid. Our results smoothly degrade if the regret is at most some small . Hence, for now on, we will asume:
Consider the utility of an agent from a fixed bid b. We can re-write it as:
Given the sequence of bids and gamma profiles, we define for any fixed bid b:
the average allocation and the average payment as a function of the fixed bid. Then we can write:
The average price-per-click term
term now plays exactly the same role in the utility function that the first-price bid does in a one-shot first price auction. We call this term
the average price-per-click of the bid in a position auction.
Fixed bid thresholds.. We will use the inverse of the PPC allocation rule for our analysis; let τ T i (z) be the price-per-click of the cheapest fixed bid that achieves average allocation at least z. More formally,
The threshold for agent i and average probability of click X i is
A.2. Revenue and Value Covering for Learning Agents
First we show that the average utility of a bidder and the average thresholld for any allocation satisfy a very useful inequality:
Lemma A.1 (Value Covering for Learning Agents). For any bidder i with value v i and average allocation amount X i ,
Proof. By the no-regret property we know that:
Thus it suffices to show that:
The latter follows exactly as in the proof of Lemma A.1. 
Combining revenue covering of a strategy profile and value covering gives a welfare approximation result for that strategy profile:
Theorem A.1 (Empirical Price of Anarchy Bound for Learning Agents). The average welfare in any µ-revenue covered strategy profile σ of auction A produced by no-regret learning agents is at least a µ 1−e −µ -approximation to the average optimal welfare.
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Appendix B: Tables and Graphs   Tables Table 2  Empirical The price of anarchy of an auction which is µ-revenue covered, either theoretically or empirically, is
Proof. First we show that even without having distributional knowledge, the threshold functions are related to the equilibrium utility of a bidder and any target utility at any Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Specifically, either the utility of a bidder at a Bayes-Nash is high compared to his value for some target allocation x i ∈ [0, 1] or the threshold T i (x i ) for acquiring this target allocation is high.
Price-per-click (PPC)
Figure 5 In full-information GSP, the threshold for agent i corresponds to a summation over all worse slots than the one he receives.
In Bayesian GSP, the threshold for bidder i in slot j is the area above the PPC allocation rule up to allocation of αjγi -note that it is not the expectation of the fullinformation threshold .
Figure 7
Examples of allocation curves (left) and threshold curves (right) for a subset of six advertisers for a specific keyword during the period of a week. All axes are normalized to 1 for privacy reasons. The circles in the left plot correspond to the expected allocation and expected threshold if bidder i was given the j-th slot in all the auctions, i.e. the circle corresponding to the highest allocation and threshold corresponds to the point (α1
Lemma C.1 (Value Covering). For any bidder i with value v i , for any allocation amount x ∈ [0, 1] and for any µ ≥ 1, where
Proof. [(Proof sketch)] The proof proceeds analogously to the proof of value covering in Hartline et al. [2014] , first defining a lower bound
, thus
The right side of Equation (C.3) is convex in
, so we can minimize it by taking first-order conditions in
Thus the right side of Equation (C.3) is minimized with u i (v i )/v i = X i e −µ , giving our desired result,
Given the value covering lemma we now proceed to proving the Theorem. Let X * (v) be the welfare optimal allocation for valuation profile v. Recall that the optimal allocation is also allowed to use the instantiation of the quality scores and is taken in expectation over the quality scores. Applying the value covering inequality of Equation (C.2) with respect to allocation quantity X * i (v) gives that for each bidder i with value v i ,
The quantity X * i (v)v i is exactly agent i's expected contribution to the welfare of the optimal auction. Applying the revenue covering inequality (3.8) for X = X * (v) and taking expectation over v yields:
By Equations (C.4) and (C.5) we obtain:
Since Welfare(A(σ)) = Rev(A(σ)) + Util(A(σ)), we have our desired result: First, for bidders with values v i < τ (1), the bound holds even without the u i term, as
Consider bidders with values v i ≥ τ (1). As such a bidder can always choose the bid with price-per-click τ (1) and get utility
. For any allocation they choose, we then have
We can improve on the bound by considering the worst-case price-per-click allocation rule that satisfies τ (1) = 1 and τ (0) = 1 − 1 k , much like in the proof of value covering.
The worst case price-per-click allocation rulex, for agents with value v = u + 1 is
Note that this is exactly the price-per-click allocation rule that results in the bidder being indifferent over all bids in [1 − 1 k
, 1], as opposed to the indifference over [0, 1] for the normal value covering proof (with a little more normalization).
We can again define T (X i ) to be the threshold based onx. We will solve numerically for the case that X i = 1 as every other case is strictly worse. So,
, and
In the worst case, u = v − 1, so
Numerically minimizing for a variety of µ and k values give the results in Table 2 . Solving this complicated maximization problem seems hopeless. In fact it can be shown that the latter problem is NP-hard by a reduction from the maximum hypergraph matching problem, when the size of the support of the correlated distribution of γ is not constant.
The hardness arises even if each γ i is either 0 or 1. We defer the proof to the full version.
However, we show that T 1 is efficiently computable. First observe that:
Thereby, X i is efficiently computable. Moreover, specializing Equation (3.13) to the position auction setting we get:
Now observe that the problem inside the expectation is equivalent to a welfare maximization problem where each player i has a value-per-click of v i =
and we want to maximize the welfare: i α π −1 (i) γ i · v i . The optimal such allocation is simply the greedy allocation which assigns slots to bidders in decreasing order of γ i · v i . Thus computing T 1 consists of running a greedy allocation algorithm for each quality score profile γ in the support of the distribution of quality scores, which would take time K · (m + n log(n)).
When applying it to the data, we will simply compute the optimal greedy allocation for each instance of the quality scores that arrives in each auction (i.e. we compute the latter for the empirical distribution of quality score profiles).
Lower bounds on maximum sum of thresholds.
If we can find a lower bound T ≤ T, then we can use T as a certificate for the optimality of our upper bound: we will know that at best the auction is T/Rev(A)-revenue covered.
One such lower bound comes from considering the case that the auction does not know the quality scores when deciding the allocation. This case is equivalent to the case that the bidder has a deterministic quality E γ [γ i ]. The total threshold can be calculated just as in Equation (C.25): let T avg = max m i T i (E γ [γ i ]α m −1 (i) ).
This can be seen as an interesting alternative welfare benchmark, even when the auction gets to see the quality scores at the allocation time. As a fixed allocation independent of the quality scores is a feasible quality score dependent allocation, we immediately get that:
T avg ≤ T ≤ T 1 . Thus we can use T avg as a certificate of approximate optimality of our upper bound T 1 to check that it is not far from the true optimal threshold T.
Appendix D: Uniform inference for price and allocation functions .
The same result can be applied to P i .
Next, we focus on the estimator x i (b) while the properties of the estimator p i (b) are established analogously. We adhere to the notation of the empirical process theory and . We define the symmetrized empirical process
Then due to the symmetrization lemma (Van Der Vaart and Wellner [1996] ) P sup
Given {b −i,t , γ t } T t=1 choose g 1 , . . . , g M where M is the 8 cover of X i meaning that
Let f * be the argmin. For any function g ∈ L 1 (P):
Now we focus on the uncertainty associated with the Radamacher sequence σ t and compute the probabilities conditional on the sample {b −i,t , γ t } T t=1 . Choose g = f − f * leading to P sup
≤ P sup
Now recall than g j are bounded byX i , thus can use Hoeffding inequality
